Daddy, what should a central banker do in a monetary economy with downwardly rigid nominal wages? My young child, she should target a low, but strictly positive, in ‡ation rate.
Introduction
The idea that nominal wages are more downwardly, than upwardly rigid, has a long history in economics, and empirical support from a large body of research based on micro data at the individual, …rm and industry levels. Earlier references include Keynes (1936) , who discusses the role of downward nominal wage rigidity in business cycle ‡uctuations; Tobin (1972) , who suggests that a positive rate of in ‡ation may be socially bene…cial in an economy where cutting nominal wages is privately costly; and Harris and Holmstrom (1982) , who show that in a setup where …rms are riskneutral and workers are risk-averse, the optimal long-term contract has an insurance component whereby the (real) wage never falls.
Turning to the empirical literature, research on wage changes at the individual level …nds that its distribution has a peak at zero, features few wage cuts, and is positively skewed. This is so even in countries, like Japan and Switzerland, where in ‡ation is very low or negative. 1 The same characteristics are found by Holden and Wulfsberg (2008) in the distribution of wage changes at the industry level in various OECD countries. Surveys on attitudes towards nominal wage cuts show that both workers and …rms dislike them, but for di¤erent reasons. Workers perceive nominal wage cuts as unfair (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1986) , while …rms are generally concerned about the e¤ect of wage cuts on morale and, in practice, only cut wages when facing bankruptcy (Bewley, 1995, and Campbell and Kamlani, 1997 ).
This paper is concerned with the macroeconomic implications of downward nominal wage rigidity, in particular for monetary policy. To that end with build a small-scale, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model where the cost of adjusting prices and wages may be asymmetric. We follow the Neo Keynesian literature in postulating a simple reduced-form mechanism to model nominal frictions in the goods and labor markets, but relax the assumption that frictions are symmetric around the current price or wage. 2 Instead, we adopt an adjustment cost function based on the linex function due to Varian (1974) , which includes the quadratic function in Rotemberg (1982) as a special case. Hence in our model, adjustment costs depend not only of the size but also on the sign of the adjustment. For example, a nominal wage cut may involve a larger frictional cost that an increase of exactly the same magnitude. The nonlinear model based on a second-order 1 See, McLaughlin (1994), Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996) , Card and Hyslop (1997) and Barattieri, Basu and Gottschalk (2009) for the United States; Farès and Lemieux (2001) for Canada, Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003) for Japan, Castellanos Castellanos, Garcia-Verdú and Kaplan (2004) for Mexico, and Fehr and Goette (2005) for Switzerland. 2 Two widely-used mechanisms are due to Rotemberg (1982) and Calvo (1983) . In the former, agents face a quadratic (and, hence, symmetric) cost for changing prices or wages. In the latter, only agents that receive an exogenous signal are allowed to re-optimize their price or wage. Solving a …rst-order approximation to a model with Calvo-type rigidity imposes symmetry by construction. approximation of the policy rules is estimated by the Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) and a simple t test is used to evaluate whether the macro date supports the view that nominal wages are downwardly rigid.
This project builds on, but makes a distinct contribution from, our previous work (Kim and Ruge-Murcia, 2009). In that paper, we carried out the analysis using a cashless economy and were primarily concerned with the optimal amount of "grease" in ‡ation. In contrast, this paper studies the positive implications of downward wage rigidity, which were not examined in our earlier contribution, and do so in the context of a fully- ‡edge monetary economy. From the modeling perspective, this paper extends Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009) by modeling the role of money as a medium of exchange. Modeling money is important for the normative analysis of monetary policy. In the cashless environment of Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009), downward wage rigidly trivially induces a positive optimal rate of in ‡ation, as was anticipated by Tobin (1972) . Thus, the object of interest is not the level of in ‡ation per se, but rather the extra optimal in ‡ation induced by asymmetric costs compared with symmetric costs (that is, "grease" in ‡ation). In a monetary economy, in ‡ation leads to the ine¢ cient economizing in money balances. Then, in the absence of nominal frictions, the optimal in ‡ation rate is negative and equal to Friedman's rule (Friedman, 1969) . With nominal frictions, optimal in ‡ation is larger than Friedman's rule but still negative (see, for example, Rotemberg and Woodford 1997). However, if nominal wages are downwardly rigid, the monetary authority faces a non-trivial trade-o¤ between positive and negative in ‡ation. Modeling this trade-o¤ explicitly is important because there is currently a discrepancy between economic theory and monetary policy in practice. The former prescribes a zero-to-negative optimal in ‡ation rate while the latter targets low, but strictly positive, in ‡ation rates. In a sense, our quantitative analysis has the ‡avor of a (friendly) match between two old, long standing views of optimal monetary policy, namely those of James Tobin and Milton Friedman.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model; Section 3 the describes the data and method used to estimate the model, and reports parameter estimates; Section 4 studies the aggregate implication of downward nominal wage rigidly, Section 5 computes the optimal in ‡ation rate and derives the (optimal) responses to shocks under the Ramsey policy that maximizes social welfare; Section 6 compute the optimal in ‡ation target under a strict targeting policy; and Section 7 concludes.
The Model
The economy consists of i ) a continuum of in…nitely-lived households with di¤erentiated job skills, ii ) a continuum of …rms that produce di¤erentiated goods using labor as sole input, and iii ) a government that implements monetary policy using a Taylor-type rule. Households and …rms interact in markets with frictions where adjusting nominal wages and prices involves convex and (possibly) asymmetric costs. The model is a monetary version of the one developed in Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009) and we refer the reader to that article for a more detailed discussion about functional forms and modelling assumptions.
Households
where E s denotes the expectation conditional on information available at time s; 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, U ( ) is the instantaneous utility function, c h t is consumption, and n h t is hours worked. Consumption is an aggregate of all di¤erentiated goods available in the economy
where > 1 is a parameter that determines the elasticity of substitution between goods. The price of this consumption bundle is
where P j;t is the price of good j: P t serves as the aggregate price index in our model economy and the gross rate of price in ‡ation is then t+1 = P t+1 =P t :
Households choose their nominal wage taking as given the …rms'demand for their labor type and face a convex cost whenever they adjust its value. This cost is represented by the function (see Varian, 1974 )
where 0 and are cost parameters. For the analysis below, it is important to keep in mind two special cases of this function. First, when ! 0; (4) becomes a quadratic function. The symmetry of the quadratic form implies that nominal wage increases or decreases of the same magnitude are equally costly. Second, when > 0; cutting nominal wages is generally more costly that raising them and so wages are downwardly rigid. These two special cases of function (4) are plotted in …gure 1. Another special case that is nested in (4) is the "L" shape used by Benigno and Ricci (2008) , which corresponds to the situation where ! 1 and implies that wage cuts are in…nitely costly while wage increases are costless.
The household's budget constraint is
where
where ; a and b are positive parameters and c h t =m h t is the consumption velocity of money. The linear representation of the household's disutility of labor is based on the indivisible-labor model due to Hansen (1985) . The form of the transaction cost function is due to Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a) and implies a money demand elasticity with respect to consumption equal to unity.
Utility maximization implies an optimal consumption demand for good j of the form
where =( 1) is the elasticity of demand with respect to the relative price of good j: Optimal money demand is implicitly de…ned by 
Firms
Firm j 2 [0; 1] produces a di¤erentiated good using the technology
where y j;t is output of good j, n j;t is labor input, x t is an aggregate productivity shock, and 2 (0; 1) is a constant parameter. The productivity shock follows the process
where 2 ( 1; 1); ln(x) is the unconditional mean of ln(x t ), and u t is a disturbance term. The disturbance is independently and identically distributed (i:i:d:) with mean zero and standard deviation
The labor input is an aggregate of di¤erentiated labor supplied by households. The aggregator takes the form
where > 1 is a parameter that determines the elasticity of substitution between labor types. The price of the labor input is
where W h t is the nominal wage demanded by the supplier of labor type h. Firms choose their nominal price taking as given the consumption demand for their good and subject to a convex cost for price changes. The real per-unit cost of a price change is
where P j;t is the nominal price of good j at time t, and 0 and & are cost parameters. In the rest of the analysis, we focus on the case where & ! 0 meaning that price adjustment costs are quadratic, as in Rotemberg (1982) .
is nominal pro…ts, which are transferred to households in the form of dividends. In the de…nition (14) , c j;t denotes the total consumption demand for good j; which is simply the integral over the individual households'demands. That is, c j;t = 1 R 0 c h j;t dh: Pro…t maximization implies the optimal labor demand schedule
where =( 1) is the elasticity of demand with respect to the relative price of labor of type h:
Government
The government sets monetary policy using the interest-rate rule
where 1 The government supplies the money balances that households demand at this interest rate using lump-sum transfers or taxes to adjusts the money stock. Hence,
where the right-hand-side is seigniorage revenue.
Equilibrium
We focus on a symmetric equilibrium where all households and …rms are identical ex-post and so Arrow-Debreu securities and bonds are not be held. Substituting the government's budget constraint and the pro…ts of the (now) representative …rm into the budget constraint of the (now) representative household delivers the economy-wide resource constraint
This equation shows that price and wage adjustment cost are deadweight losses that (ine¢ ciently) reduce the quantity of output available for consumption.
Solution Method
The model is solved by taking a second-order expansion of the …rst-order conditions, the resource 
Estimation 3.1 Data
The data used to estimate the model are quarterly observations of hours worked, real consumption per capita, real money balances per capita, the price in ‡ation rate, the wage in ‡ation rate, and The nominal interest rate is the e¤ective federal funds rate. Except for the nominal interest rate, all data are seasonally adjusted at the source. The series were logged and linearly detrended prior to the estimation of the model.
SMM Estimation
The second-order approximate solution of our nonlinear DSGE model is estimated using the Simu- and the …rst-to fourth-order autocovariances of our data series.
We estimate twelve structural parameters. The parameters are those of the price and wage adjustment cost functions ( , and ), the transaction cost function (a and b), the monetary policy rule ( 1 , 2 ; 3 and v ), the productivity shock process ( and u ), and the consumption curvature in the utility function ( ). Additional information is used to …x the values of four parameters to economically plausible numbers during the estimation routine. These parameters are the curvature of the production function (1 ), the discount factor, and the elasticities of substitution between goods and between labor types ( and , respectively). Data from the U.S. National Income and
Product Accounts (NIPA) shows that the share of labor in total income is approximately 2=3 and, hence, a plausible value for is 1=3. The discount rate is set to 0:997; which is the inverse the average gross real interest rate during the sample period. Finally, the elasticities of substitution between goods and between labor types are …xed to = 1:1 and = 1:4; respectively, which are standard values in the literature.
In addition to the model with asymmetric wage adjustment costs, we estimate the restricted model with quadratic costs that corresponds to the case where = 0: This model provides a useful benchmark to evaluate the implications of downward wage rigidity. Both prices and wages are rigid in the sense that the null hypotheses = 0 and = 0 cannot be rejected at the one percent signi…cance level. 4 The wage asymmetry parameter is = 7146:3 (1840:4); which is positive and statistically di¤erent from zero. 5 Based on this result, we conclude that nominal wages are downwardly rigid. This …nding is important because, as we show below, asymmetric wage rigidity modi…es previous conclusions regarding the relative importance of price versus wage rigidity, the e¤ects of monetary policy shocks, and the optimal rate of in ‡ation. To see the …rst point, consider the restricted version of our model where = 0 so that adjustment costs are quadratic and, hence, symmetric. Parameter estimates for this model are reported in the second column of table 1. In the absence of asymmetry, the degree of nominal wage (price) rigidity is represented by ( ) alone. Since is much larger than (711:3 and 42:0; respectively), one would conclude that wages are generally more rigid than prices. In contrast, in the model with asymmetric adjustment costs, nominal rigidity is not summarized by and , but depends on the asymmetry parameter as well. Since is now quantitatively closer to but the wage asymmetry parameter is positive and large, we conclude instead that prices and wages are similarly upwardly rigid but that wages are more downwardly rigid than prices. This is more that a semantic re…nement because, as we show below, the e¤ects of monetary shocks are very di¤erent in the models with quadratic and asymmetric adjustment costs.
Parameter Estimates
Finally, the coe¢ cients of the Taylor-type rule are in line with previous estimates reported elsewhere in the literature (for example, Taylor, 1999 , and the references therein).
Aggregate Implications of Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity
In this section we study the implications of downward nominal wage rigidity for the economy's response to a monetary policy shock and for the higher-order moments of the data, and compare them with those obtained under the assumption that wage rigidity is symmetric.
Impulse-Response Analysis
In this section we examine the economy's response to a monetary policy shock. Since, the responses of nonlinear dynamic systems typically depend on the sign, size and timing of the shock (see, Gallant, Rossi and Tauchen, 1993, and Koop, Pesaran, and Potter, 1996), our experiments involve shocks of di¤erent sign and sizes. More precisely, we consider innovations to the interest rate rule of +2; +1; 1 and 2 standard deviations. A positive shock leads to an increase in the nominal interest rate and is, therefore contractionary, while a negative shock is expansionary. In all cases, we assume that shocks take place when the system is at its stochastic steady state. That is, when all variables are equal to their unconditional mean. to the stochastic steady state faster in the former than in the latter case. Since price rigidity is symmetric, the asymmetric response of price in ‡ation is entirely due to the downward rigidity of nominal wages through general equilibrium e¤ects. Also, in this case, the quantitative e¤ects of the large negative shock are more than twice those of the smaller one, but the converse is true for positive shocks.
The asymmetry is the especially pronounced in the case of wage in ‡ation. In all experiments, a monetary shock delivers an increases in wage in ‡ation. Positive shocks induce larger responses than negative shocks of the same magnitude, and feature almost no overshooting. These responses on the part of price and wage in ‡ation imply that real wages rise after a monetary shock regardless of whether the shock is expansionary or contractionary. 6 In this sense, real wages are downwardly rigid with respect to monetary policy shocks. The fact that the real wage may rise following an expansionary monetary shock moderates the expected increase in output and consumption and explains the asymmetric e¤ect of monetary shocks on these two variables. 
Higher-Order Moments
We now derive and evaluate the model predictions for higher-order moments of the variables. This is important for three reasons. First, in contrast to linear DSGE models that inherit their higherorder properties directly from the shock innovations, the nonlinear propagation mechanism in our model means that economic variables may be non-Gaussian, even if innovations are Gaussian.
Second, this observation means that up to the extent that actual data has non-Gaussian features, comparing the higher-order moments predicted by the model with those of the data may be a useful tool to evaluate the model. Finally, since previous literature on downward wage rigidity documents the positive skewness of individual nominal wage changes, it is interesting to examine whether the same is true for the representative household in our model. , 1996) . In general, the asymmetric model generates fatter tails than the quadratic model and so is closer to the data on consumption, price in ‡ation, and the rate of nominal interest. However, precisely for this reason, its predictions are less accurate regarding the kurtosis of hours, the real wage and real balances, which have thin tails.
What Would Ramsey Do?
In this section, we study optimal policy in a monetary economy where wages are downwardly rigid. In particular, we consider the problem of a government that follows the Ramsey policy of maximizing the households'welfare subject to the aggregate resource constraint and the …rst-order conditions of …rms and households. It is assumed that the government uses the same discount factor as households to evaluate future utilities, and that it can credibly commit to the implementation of the optimal policy. The second-order approximation of the model is solved by the method discussed in Section 2.5 and the resulting decision rules are used to compute the optimal average in ‡ation rate and the optimal responses to productivity shocks.
Optimal In ‡ation Target
The optimal average rate of gross in ‡ation is the one observed at the stochastic steady state under the Ramsey policy. Recall that, by the de…nition, all variables are at their unconditional mean at the stochastic steady state. We compute these means from the decision rules using the parameter values reported in column1 of table 1. Results indicate that mean gross in ‡ation is 1.0038, meaning that optimal net in ‡ation is 0.38 percent per year. In contrast to earlier literature on optimal monetary policy, 7 this (net) in ‡ation rate is positive. This means that for an economy with downwardly rigid wages, the bene…ts of positive in ‡ation conjectured by Tobin (1972) -that is, that in ‡ation greases the wheels of the labor market-can overcome Friedman's (1969) general prescription of negative in ‡ation. As in the cashless economy in Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009), this result is driven by prudence: the Ramsey planner prefers to incur the systematic, but small, price and wage adjustment costs associated with positive in ‡ation rate rather than taking the chance of having to pay the large adjustment costs required to implement nominal wage decreases. However, in contrast to Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009), this is so even after taking into account the bene…ts of negative in ‡ation pointed out by Friedman.
We now examine the relation between optimal in ‡ation and, respectively, the volatility of the productivity shock and the degree of downward nominal wage rigidity. First, consider …gure 4 that plots optimal in ‡ation as a function of the standard deviation of the productivity innovation, holding all other variables at their unconditional means. The range of the standard deviation is [0; 0:25]: Notice that when there is no uncertainty, meaning that u = 0; optimal in ‡ation is only 0:9994: As volatility increases, optimal in ‡ation increases in u : The relation is quadratic because the decision rules are linear in the conditional variance of productivity and, hence, quadratic in its standard deviation. The value for optimal average in ‡ation reported above, namely 1:0038;
corresponds to the SMM estimate of u , that is, 0:011: Figure 5 plots optimal in ‡ation as a function of the wage asymmetry parameter : In the case where = 0, optimal in ‡ation is 0:9993 and we recover the result reported in earlier literature.
That is, that in a monetary economy with sticky prices and wages, optimal (net) in ‡ation lies between Friedman's rule and zero. Initially, as increases, so does optimal in ‡ation, reaching the global maximum at around = 4500. Thereafter as the asymmetry parameter increases further, optimal in ‡ation declines monotonically eventually converging to 0:9995. 
Optimal Responses
The optimal responses to a productivity shock are reported in …gure 6. Following a positive productivity shock, consumption and output increase before returning to their stochastic steady state. The reason is well understood: an exogenous productivity increase permits a larger output with the same inputs and this creates a wealth e¤ect that allows consumption to raise today and in the future. A negative productivity shock has the converse e¤ects. There is some asymmetry between positive and negative shocks, with the latter inducing larger adjustments than the former.
Positive (negative) shocks induce an initial decrease (increase) in price in ‡ation. There is some asymmetry with respect to the shock size and the dynamics involve in ‡ation overshooting its long-run value. The real wage increases following a positive shock and decreases following a negative one, with the responses proportionally larger in the former case. In this sense, real wages are downwardly rigid with respect to productivity shocks under the optimal policy.
There is considerable asymmetry in the responses of wage in ‡ation, the nominal and real interest rates and real money balances to productivity shocks. In the case of wage in ‡ation, all shocks induce an increase in wage in ‡ation. In particular, following a negative productivity shock and in order to avoid incurring the large costs associated with nominal wage cuts, the Ramsey policy involves wage increases throughout and instead the decrease in the real wage is implemented via an increase in the price level. This result illustrates Tobin's proposition that a positive rate of price in ‡ation may be socially bene…cial in an economy with downwardly rigid wages.
Real money balances decrease (increase) after negative (positive) shocks. Responses are asymmetric in that the e¤ects of a negative shock are larger than those of a positive shock of the same magnitude. Since, by construction, the money stock is held …xed in this experiment, this asymmetry is due to the asymmetric responses to productivity shocks on the part of consumption and the price level.
The optimal policy involves an increase in the nominal interest rate after a negative shock and a decrease after a positive one. The initial responses of the real interest rate are the opposite-that is, the real interest rate falls after a negative shock and rises after a positive one. However, after the second period the real interest rate responses are reversed and, therefore, equivalent to those of the nominal rate. Note that responses are asymmetric. For example, the shock of size 2 induces an increase in nominal rate of 1:21 percent while the positive shock of the same size induces a decrease of 0:58. The very asymmetric response in the nominal interest rate under the optimal policy allows a smoother, less asymmetric response on the part of consumption, output and real balances to productivity shocks.
What Should a Central Banker Do?
In order to study the normative implications of downward nominal wage rigidity under a policy more realistic than Ramsey's, we compute the in ‡ation rate that delivers the highest (unconditional) welfare when the monetary authority follows a simple rule that strictly hits an in ‡ation target. Notes: The skewness and kurtosis predicted by the asymmetric and quadratic cost models were computed using 10000 simulated observations. The skewness and kurtosis of the Normal distribution are 0 and 3, respectively. 
